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In psychotherapy research, “validity” is canonically understood as the capacity of a test
to measure what is purported to measure. However, we argue that this psychometric
understanding of validity prohibits working researchers from considering the validity of
their research. Psychotherapy researchers often use measures with a different epistemic
goal than test developers intended, for example when a depression symptom measure
is used to indicate “treatment success” (cf. outcome measurement for evidence-based
treatment). However, the validity of a measure does not cover the validity of its use as
operationalization of another target concept within a research procedure, nor the validity
of its function toward an epistemic goal. In this paper, we discuss the importance of
considering validity of the epistemic process beyond the validity of measures per se,
based on an empirical case example from our psychotherapy study (“SCS”, Cornelis
et al., 2017). We discuss why the psychometric understanding of validity is insufficient
in covering epistemic validity, and we evaluate to what extent the available terminology
regarding validity of research is sufficient for working researchers to accurately consider
the validity of their overall epistemic process. As psychotherapy research is meant
to offer a sound evidence-base for clinical practice, we argue that it is vital that
psychotherapy researchers are able to discuss the validity of the epistemic choices
made to serve the clinical goal.
Keywords: validity, epistemic validity, validity or research, psychotherapy research, evidence-based treatment,
empirical case study, evidence-based case study
INTRODUCTION
Any psychology scholar looking for information on the validity of a psychotherapeutic or clinical
study knows where to find it: under “Measures” in the Methods section. In psychotherapy research
it is common, and often formally required for publication, to use the IMRAD-format (Introduction-
Methods-Results-and-Discussion) to report on empirical results, in which the use of validated
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instruments1 is presented in the Methods section (cf. Madigan
et al., 1995). However, in this paper we argue that the heuristic
placement of validity issues under the Measures header gives
the false impression that validity only matters with regard to
measures. As psychotherapy research is applied research with
the clear goal of understanding and improving clinical practice,
the validity of the entire research process is vital for epistemic,
clinical and societal reasons. With this paper, we aim to address
psychotherapy researchers and use concrete clinical research data
to discuss why it is insufficient for valid psychotherapy research
to limit the understanding of validity to instruments.2
In psychological research, validity is generally understood
as a psychometric concept that refers to “measur[ing] what is
purported to measure” (Borsboom et al., 2004, p. 1061). Newton
and Shaw (2013, p. 203) note that in different scientific fields
validity may have a broader scope than just measurement issues,
yet still they limit their discussion to the psychometric definition
of validity, as do the majority of scholars that are currently
involved in the debate (e.g., Crooks et al., 1996; Kane, 2001,
2013; Borsboom et al., 2004; Hood, 2009; Cizek, 2012). In this
paper, we start from the observation that the use of the term
validity in psychotherapy research is predominantly understood
in psychometric terms. This might be less of a problem if test
construction is the sole goal of research, but we argue that it is
highly problematic in the broader scientific endeavor of applied
research such as psychotherapy research.
Applied research can be distinguished from fundamental
or basic research. Applied research is focused at gaining
knowledge with the explicit goal to apply this knowledge in
non-scientific contexts, rather than to gain knowledge for the
sake of knowledge expansion per se (cf. Danziger, 1990). For
example, psychotherapy research3 is conducted to be able to
disseminate “evidence-based” treatments into clinical practice,
technical innovation or artificial intelligence research can be
focused at improving concrete daily tasks or societal systems,
educational research is focused at in situ assessment within the
various learning environments, environmental research can be
conducted with the explicit goal to design political policy, et
cetera. Practically, this goal-oriented base of applied research
implies that local, historical and social circumstances may
play a substantial role in the research procedure (cf. Douglas,
2009). Whereas such factors may be the object of interest in
1Note that the expression “valid measures” is technically misleading as no
instrument is valid in itself: instruments can only be used validly in a
specified domain of application and with guidelines on score interpretation
(Newton and Shaw, 2014).
2In this paper, we distinguish validity of instruments from the validity of the overall
scientific endeavor. We refer to the validity of instruments either by the term
“test validity”, “instrumental validity”, or “psychometric validity”. We refer to the
validity of the overall scientific endeavor by the term “epistemic validity”.
3Note that the level of goal-orientedness may differ within scientific disciplines
as well. Psychology is exemplary, as psychotherapeutic and clinical research are
explicitly focused at providing evidence for use in clinical practice, whereas
branches of experimental psychology, for example, are focused on gathering
evidence for the sake of knowledge expansion per se. This difference in goals
affects the requirements for research methodology (cf. Mook, 1983), as the more
fundamental subdisciplines hold stricter requirements for standardization and
control and value generalizability less, while for the more applied subdisciplines
it is vice versa.
fundamental research, in applied research they may also play
an important role from the decision to study a specific topic all
the way to the decisions on how to apply, whom to disseminate
findings to and on what scale, what impact the application may
have, et cetera (cf. Cartwright and Stegenga, 2011, on evidence
generation focused on use).
In applied research, to design a methodologically sound
study, researchers thus have to make a broad range of epistemic
choices before and beyond measurement. However, as “validity”
is heuristically used with reference to instruments, these vital
epistemic choices cannot properly be judged on their validity
because they do not fall under instrumental validity per se.
Therefore, we argue that it is crucial for psychotherapy research
to be able to think about validity in a broader epistemic sense than
the current focus on test validity allows for.
The problem that we address in this paper is not new. The
question of what constitutes valid research is central to on-going
discussions in psychotherapeutic and methodological research
literature, that yield the problem of operationalization (e.g.,
cf. Danziger, 1990; Westen et al., 2004; Barkham et al., 2010;
Castonguay, 2011), the nature of psychological constructs and
variables (e.g., Michell, 1997; cf. Woodward, 1989; Toomela,
2007) and how accurately they are represented by measures
(Michell, 2013; Tal, 2016; cf. Truijens et al., 2019), the issue of
choosing primary outcome variables (Wampold, 2001; De Los
Reyes et al., 2011) and according measures (e.g., US Department
of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration,
2009), and how this choice affects the interpretation of outcome
(Stegenga, 2015), the discussion on qualitative or quantitative
methods of analysis (e.g., McLeod, 2001; Stiles, 2006; Hill
et al., 2013; Gergen et al., 2015), the discussion on clinical
significance (Jacobson and Truax, 1991; Lambert and Ogles,
2009), and so on. However, as these issues are discussed in
different corners of psychological, methodological, medical and
philosophical literature, it often goes unnoticed that they all fall
under the broader question of validity of the epistemic process
of psychotherapy research. A variety of issues are thus known
and discussed in their own terms, but the field lacks a meta-
theory or conceptual framework to consider how these issues
connect, thus indicating a common root in the overall epistemic
process. This leads to the underestimation of the impact of
these epistemic issues and prevents working researchers from
properly taking these issues into consideration in their scientific
endeavor. In other words: because of a lacking conceptual
framework that is broad enough to encompass the shared roots
of the issues voiced in the literature, researchers cannot take the
problems seriously enough.
Even though the voiced critiques and worries are substantive
and persuasive, they apparently have not sufficiently reached
working psychologists. The aim of our paper therefore is
straightforward: we want to show as clearly as possible why
test validity is insufficient in capturing the validity of the
overall research endeavor in psychology, to concretely imply
awareness in working psychologists. We use the working concept
validity of the epistemic process, or – in short – epistemic
validity, to elaborate and denominate the connection between
the various epistemic problems voiced in the literature, and to
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FIGURE 1 | The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) graphically displayed as a
valid operationalization of the construct depression symptoms.
allow for concrete consideration of their impact on the validity
of conducted psychotherapy research. This way, we argue for
the need of a conceptual framework of epistemic quality control
that can broaden the classic IMRAD-format such that the issues
faced in designing and conducting psychotherapy research can
be discussed as thoroughly as needed, given their substantial
impact on the understanding of psychotherapeutic efficacy and
clinical practice.
OPERATIONALIZATION AND TEST
VALIDITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY
RESEARCH
In this section we first argue that in psychotherapy research,
validity is and should be understood more broadly than test
validity alone, which we illustrate subsequently with a case
from our psychotherapy study. We start our argument using
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1996) as an
exemplar. The BDI is a very commonly used instrument to
detect depression symptoms as defined by the DSM-IV (Rogers
et al., 2005). The validity of the instrument was tested in a
multitude of studies and was summarized by Beck et al. (1988).
The test has detection of depression symptoms as its end,
and the test validity confirms that the instrument is adequate
as a means to satisfy the proposed end. Consequently, the
measure can serve as a valid operationalization of the construct
it aims to measure.4 This relationship between construct and
instrument is graphically displayed as in Figure 1. Note that
in this figure we used the graphics that are common in
psychological education: The circle represents the construct or
variable and the square represents the operationalization of that
construct (Mook and Parker, 2001).
4For a thorough discussion of the feasibility of “construct validity”, see Newton
and Shaw (2014), Alexandrova and Haybron (2016), and Slaney (2017).
In practice, the BDI is indeed commonly used in the
context of clinical diagnostics (Rogers et al., 2005). Beyond
such direct depression symptom detection, however, the BDI
is also increasingly used as a so-called “outcome measure” in
psychotherapy research. Outcome measures are used to gain
systematic quantified evidence on the efficacy of treatments
in samples of patients, which is becoming an increasingly
common practice in the era of evidence-based treatments (EBTs;
Wampold, 2001). Practically, instruments such as the BDI are
administered to a sample of patients before and after a specific
treatment, and the pre-post difference score of this sample is
compared to a sample of patients who did receive different or
no treatment (ibid.). In this case, the BDI is used to indicate
depression severity changes over the course of a treatment, which
is used as an indicator of the efficacy of the treatment that
was administered.
In this research context, the BDI serves as the
operationalization of the concept “treatment efficacy”.
Consequently, the BDI is no longer simply the operationalization
of the concept of “depression symptoms”, but it becomes the
operationalization of the concept “depression severity change
over time”,5 which itself functions as the operationalization
of the concept “treatment efficacy”. This sequence of
operationalizations is shown in Figure 2, where the additional
operationalization “change in depression symptoms severity” is
displayed in a square between the concept “treatment success”6
and the operationalization “BDI”. In this design, the BDI is used
as the instrument to indicate treatment success, even though an
additional step was added to the operationalization sequence. As
the target concept of the BDI now becomes an operationalization
of another concept, namely “treatment success”, the BDI serves
as the means toward another end than its initial end of simple
depression symptom detection.
At this point, however, the question rises whether the test
validity of the BDI covers this additional step in the sequence
of operationalizations. The validity of the BDI serves as an
indicator of accurate depression symptom measurement, i.e., the
validity of the instrument indicates that the BDI is valid as a
means to satisfy its end, which is depression symptom detection.
However, this does not necessarily indicate that the BDI is a
valid indicator of treatment success, nor that it is inherent to
the concept treatment efficacy to operationalize it as symptom
severity change as measured by the BDI. As becomes clear from
Figure 2, the test validity of the instrument BDI is only part
of the epistemic validity of the operationalization of treatment
efficacy per se. Therefore, it is not feasible to rely on the validity
5Note that in the sequence of operationalizations that is used in a RCT-type pre-
post design, it is necessary to operationalize efficacy in terms of change, which
means that the BDI is not only used to signal another construct (i.e., treatment
success) but also that a BDI difference score is necessary to indicate change over
time. The use of a difference score as indicative for change over treatment is an
operationalization in itself, thus it should be possible to judge this step on its
validity. See Westen et al. (2004) and McClimans (2010), for example, on the
assumption of stable numerical representation of therapeutic transformation.
6Note that “treatment efficacy” can only formally be substantiated if treatment
success is shown in at least two independent randomized controlled trials
(Chambless and Hollon, 1998). Therefore, in this section we continue our
argument with the concept “treatment success”.
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FIGURE 2 | Treatment success is operationalized as depression symptom
severity change, which is operationalized as a difference score on the BDI
(Beck et al., 1988).
of tests as reported in the Measures section, to guarantee the
epistemic validity of the overall study design that is embedded
in an epistemic procedure by researchers. In the next section, we
present an empirical case study to emphasize the importance of
epistemic validity for concrete psychotherapeutic research.
Case: Where Validity Goes Beyond the
Validity of Tests
To clarify the relationship between test validity and epistemic
validity in the practical context of psychotherapy research,
we discuss the findings from an empirical case study by
Cornelis et al. (2017),7 that was conducted in the context of
a broader psychotherapy study that was conducted at Ghent
University, Belgium (“SCS”, cf. Desmet, 2018). In the following,
we briefly describe the study outline and the research team, and
subsequently discuss the case findings, to set the stage for our
argumentation in empirical terms.
Study Outline
The data used in this paper were gathered in a mixed method
psychotherapy study conducted at Ghent University from 2009
onward (Cornelis et al., 2017). In this study, patients in a
private psychotherapy practice were followed on a session-by-
session basis with a variety of means. Every month, patients
completed validated symptom measures such as the BDI (Beck
et al., 1996), the Symptom Checklist (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1992),
7All data used in this paper was previously published by Cornelis et al. (2017).
Tables are reprinted with permission.
and the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP-32; Horowitz
et al., 2000). Every session, patients scored the General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg and Williams, 1988) and an
idiosyncratic item that was based on the primary complaint at
the start of treatment as formulated by the patient. Furthermore,
the patient collected saliva samples, which allowed for analysis of
cortisol stress hormone development over the course of therapy
and follow-up. Every treatment session was audiotaped to enable
qualitative and narrative analyses. Patients agreed to participate
in four follow-up interviews in the 2 years after treatment
termination, which were accompanied by the same test battery
and biological data collection as during treatment. Finally, 2 years
after termination, patient’s health insurance files were requested,
which yielded the health care costs from 2 years before the start
of therapy up till 2 years after treatment termination. Figure 3
shows the information gathered for each patient in the study.8
Research Team
All authors were involved in the conduct of the SCS
psychotherapy study, which was supervised by the third and
fifth author. The therapy was conducted in the private practice
of the third author. At the start of the study, the therapist
was a 36-year old Caucasian male with 5.5 years of clinical
experience in psychodynamic psychotherapy, based on principles
of supportive-expressive treatment as defined by Luborsky
(1984). All five authors were employed as researchers at
the university department that hosted the study. The first,
second, and fourth author were doctoral candidates and were
involved in the data collection throughout their terms. Regarding
the current case, they were involved in the management
of the quantitative and biological data collection and they
conducted interviews. A systematic case study was conducted
by a research team including the second, third, and fifth
author (cf. Cornelis et al., 2017, for a description of the
methodological process). For the current paper, the five authors
were involved in a reflection on the interpretations of the
findings, which was used by the first author to derive a vignette
of the case that serves as an empirical exhibit within the
argumentation on validity.
Case
James started treatment voluntarily after being referred by his
general practitioner. After the second preliminary session with
his therapist, he agreed to participate in the psychotherapy study.
James received 26 sessions of supportive-expressive treatment (cf.
Luborsky, 1984). At the start of treatment, James, a Caucasian
male, was 29 years old and suffered from depression- and anxiety
complaints related to an obsessive thought that started when he
met his girlfriend. James was terrified that he would stab his
girlfriend with a knife, and that he would not be able to control
himself. This brought up a range of life-long fears of being a loser
8The study design and proceedings were approved by the Ethical Board of the
Ghent University Hospital in Belgium (Registration no. B670201318127). All
patients gave written informed consent to collect, analyze, and publish their
individual data throughout and after treatment. All identifying information
concerning the patient has been changed to protect confidentiality. The data
are denoted by an anonymous participant code and the patient is referred to
by a pseudonym.
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FIGURE 3 | Individual outcome measure battery throughout treatment for patient James (retrieved from Cornelis et al., 2017; reprinted with permission).
and a harmful person to other people, which he thought made
him unworthy of life.
At the start of treatment, James’s BDI score was 20, thus
his depression symptom severity could be considered moderate9
(Beck et al., 1996). After treatment termination, he only scored
9 on the BDI both at post-measure and at the 2-year follow-
up, which would be classified as minimal (ibid.). Based on the
BDI as the primary outcome measure (cf. De Los Reyes et al.,
2011), this reduction of pre-post scores could be taken as an
indication that the therapy has been successful (see Cornelis
et al., 2017, for detailed information on individual clinical
significance of this reduction). For James, this conclusion is
in line with narrative information in the follow-up interviews:
although the obsessive thought still popped up every now
and then, James felt confident that he could ignore that
thought, which significantly reduced his experience of fear.
Moreover, as he got the reassurance of control over these
fears, he felt worthier of living. Besides the residual anxiety
symptoms, he explicitly stated that he did not experience
depression anymore. This cross-validation or triangulation
indeed indicates a reduction of initial depressive symptoms, and
therefore supports a positive conclusion regarding treatment
success. Note that it is somewhat simplistic to reach this
9In the BDI guidelines, the following classification is given to determine the
severity of depression based on BDI-scores: 0–13: minimal depression, 14–
19: mild depression, 20–28: moderate depression, or 29–63: severe depression
(Beck et al., 1996).
conclusion based on a single individual pre-post difference, yet
it still functions as an illustration of common methodological
reasoning in psychotherapeutic research (see Truijens, 2017,
for a discussion of this line of reasoning in psychotherapeutic
efficacy methodology).
Whereas the BDI is often used as an outcome measure, within
the data collection in this psychotherapy study, several of other
data sources could have been used as outcome measures and
therefore as operationalizations of treatment success as well.
As was discussed above, the BDI shows a symptom reduction
that was in line with narrative follow-up information, indicating
a long-term impact of the treatment on James’s complaints.
However, James’s cortisol levels show a different image of long-
term success: whereas his stress levels indeed reduced over the
course of treatment, at the second follow-up his stress hormone
levels were about twice as high as baseline (Figures 4A,B). This
might change our idea of treatment efficacy in the long run, as
the stress hormone levels show an important reduction during
treatment but an alarming increase after treatment, which may
impact the long-term durability of treatment success (Cornelis
et al., 2017). However, it is not evident to reach a sound and clear
conclusion based on this number; to make sense of this increase,
the idiosyncratic information should be taken into account to
find out whether the increase is related to depressive symptoms
or to, for example, regular life stressors (cf. Truijens, 2017).
Nonetheless, these stress hormone levels could be a highly
informative operationalization of treatment success, especially
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FIGURE 4 | Three different outcome or process measures for patient James (retrieved from Cornelis et al., 2017; reprinted with permission): (A) the BDI (Beck et al.,
1988) from baseline to 1-year follow-up; (B) cortisol stress hormone measures from baseline to 1-year follow-up; (C) medical health care costs from years prior to
2 years after treatment.
because of the long-term health problems such as cardiovascular
diseases and metabolic issues that are related to elevated stress
levels (Walker, 2007; Wester and Van Rossum, 2015), which are
associated with increasing societal and financial risks (World
Health Organization, 2008). Thus, for a researcher who was
interested in the societal cost-benefit balance this could be
an interesting way to operationalize treatment success. If this
operationalization was used as the primary outcome measure,
the conclusion of treatment success in this case would be rather
ambiguous in the long run and would at least need more
information to understand the stress level increase.
A second alternative source of information on the treatment
success in James’s case could be the information on his medical
health costs (Figure 4C). This shows both his number of
consultations with general and medical practitioners and his
medication use, which in James’s case was anti-depressant
medication. Whereas for James, his reported depression
symptoms changed on the BDI, the dose of anti-depressant
drugs was increased for example quite shortly after treatment
termination. If this data source was taken as the primary
outcome measure, the image of “treatment success” would be
rather different than if we would take self-report information
on the BDI and in follow-up interviews as our primary
outcome measures.
The two examples of alternative outcome measures show
either a more ambiguous or an entirely different story of
treatment success than the BDI does as the primary outcome
measure. This could spark a discussion on the convergent or
concurrent validity of these measures, which would ultimately
lead to a discussion on the construct validity of each of these
means as satisfying the end of treatment success indication.
However, by tapping into the discussion of test validity right
away, we would skip a rather crucial step in the empirical process
that comes before the question of construct validity of measures.
The previously discussed “outcomes” in James’s case show
three possible ways of operationalizing “treatment success”.
These three ways are ad hoc, as they entail the measures that
we – the authors – as psychotherapy researchers decided to use
in our study design, given our theoretical, empirical and clinical
framework and our clinical and epistemic goal (cf. Cornelis et al.,
2017). Importantly, this shows that the operationalization that is
chosen by a researcher, a group of researchers, or a paradigmatic
field of researchers, is not self-evident. There is no inherent
reason to choose a specific operationalization in applied research
designs such as the one discussed here in psychotherapy research.
There is no inherent characteristic or ontological essence in a
concept such as “treatment success”.10 So before asking whether
10In the on-going discussion on construct validity regarding test construction and
use, different authors disagree on whether it should be assumed that the test does
capture an ontological essence of the purported construct. The tension between
realists (e.g., Borsboom et al., 2004) and instrumentalists (e.g., Cronbach and
Meehl, 1955; Kane, 2013) is described extensively in Newton and Shaw (2014;
Chapter 5). However, the argument in the current paper is not focused on the
target construct of the measure but on the construct that is represented by another
construct, which in this example could convey multiple (moral, societal, clinical,
technical. . .) interpretations. Therefore, the discussion on ontology of construct
measures does not apply to our examples, and subsequently the discussion does
not allow for a primary solution to the problem that we propose in this paper. See
further the next section of this paper.
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a specific measure is valid in doing its job as an indicator of such
a target concept, the researcher must decide how he intends to
operationalize that concept in the first place.
This notion has a rather crucial consequence for
psychotherapy researchers: Regardless of the validity of the
BDI as a means to indicate depression symptom severity, the
researcher should be able to validate his decision to operationalize
the target concept “treatment success” as “depression symptom
severity change” (cf. Westen et al., 2004, for a discussion of
this specific operationalization). So, before the researcher asks
the question of validity of his instruments, he must first decide
which means to use to satisfy his proposed operationalization.
Surely, this decision must be informed by the validity of different
available means – such as the BDI but also the cortisol levels
or the health insurance costs – but first the researcher should
be able to show that his proposed operationalization is valid to
satisfy its proposed end – such as indicating “treatment success”.
The crucial point therefore is that it is a choice by the
researcher how he or she operationalizes the concept of interest.
This choice may be informed by theory, by common epistemic
practice, by experience, by face validity, et cetera. Either way,
it is an epistemic choice in which the researcher plays a
crucial role. Therefore, in the case of James we could question
the way treatment success was operationalized in general, and
more importantly we could ask which way of operationalizing
is more useful for the purposes of that specific research.
Especially in the era of EBT, this epistemic pragmatism is a
very relevant question for psychotherapy research: All research
designs are chosen in function of some epistemic context that
makes it relevant and important to conduct that particular
study (Figure 5).
FIGURE 5 | The validity of the research process entails both the internal
validity of the design and the epistemic validity of the function of the design in
a researcher’s epistemic endeavor.
As becomes clear from Figure 5, neither the way that a
concept is operationalized nor the function of the process
of operationalization in the overall epistemic endeavor of the
researcher are (necessarily) covered by the test validity of the
instrument that is used. Nonetheless, these steps generate real and
relevant validity questions.11 To capture this broader epistemic
context in which the research design is embedded, we use the
working concept epistemic validity.12 In the next section, we
argue that this understanding of validity goes beyond the current
validity debates in the (mainly psychometric) literature, and we
discuss how actual psychotherapy researchers could think about
and discuss the epistemic validity of (1) their operationalization
and (2) its function in their overall epistemic process.
VALIDITY BEYOND PSYCHOMETRICS
In this section, we discuss the current use of validity terminology
in psychological research, to understand how it fails to cover the
problem of applied research that we elucidated in the previous
section. First, we argue that the dominant understanding of
psychometric validity is insufficient in covering the question
of what constitutes a valid epistemic process in psychotherapy
research. Subsequently, we overview the available terminology
regarding validity of research to evaluate whether those terms
allow for consideration of the validity of operationalization
sequences in applied research, as well as the function of the
chosen operationalizations within the epistemic endeavor of
working researchers.
Validity became a field-wide issue in psychology when the
American Psychological Association initiated a task force to work
11Another example of where validity problems go beyond the scope of
instrumental validity per se, regards the content of data which is “collected from”
sense-making agents, i.e., human beings that wonder why they are assessed or
participate in assessment with a concrete motivation to be assessed. Elaborating on
this issue would be beyond the scope of the current paper, so we refer to Truijens
et al. (2019), which provides a detailed analysis of validity problems that appear at
the level of “the data” in psychotherapy research, but cannot be taken into account
by means of psychometric validity.
12We use the term epistemic validity to denote the validity of the overall epistemic
process as a working concept, to make clear that different validity issues share a
common root in the overall epistemic process. The term “epistemic validity” has
been used before in different contexts. Prilleltensky (2008) proposed it as one of
two parts of “psychopolitical validity”. According to Prilleltensky (2008), epistemic
psychopolitical validity “is achieved by the systematic account of the role of power
in political and psychological dynamics affecting phenomena of interest” (p. 130),
whereas the “transformative” part is focused on the social changes that are brought
about by these power relations. Based on these terms, he argues for the need of
incorporating and evaluating power relations in knowledge generation practices,
within the broader initiative of action psychology or power psychology. We
consider these issues important indeed, but rather than using “epistemic validity”
to focus specifically on power relations in the community, we take power relations
as one possible part of the overall epistemic process, as this process indeed includes
multiple levels of decision making that are issue to validity questions. Further, the
term epistemic validation is used by Costa and Levi (1996) to evaluate whether
“causal conditionals” (i.e., factors that are hypothesized to be causal, within a
theoretical framework) can be made concrete within testable “epistemic models”
(rather than just be theoretically argued for) and therefore can be evaluated on
their truth value in concrete terms. Here, the term epistemic validation serves the
purpose of evaluating the logic of formal arguments in concrete terms, yet the
content of the epistemic models is not (and does not have to be) made concrete for
these authors. For our purposes, though, we use to term precisely to signal those
concrete epistemic circumstances that are encountered in applied research.
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out guidelines for quality control of testing in psychology and
education (Newton and Shaw, 2013, 2014; Slaney, 2017). This
led to international Standards for Educational and Psychological
Testing, which were initially based on the canonical paper by
Cronbach and Meehl (1955). According to Cronbach, it is not
only important to safeguard a measure’s ability to measure
what is meant to be measured, but it is also crucial for test
developers to provide guidelines for valid test use, so that
test score interpretation can be accurately embedded in and
justified by the current nomological network. Three decades
later, Messick (1980, 1989) distinguished validity from the social
consequences of use. According to Messick, an instrument should
bear construct validity, which is the capacity of the test itself
to capture the purported constructs or theorized variables, but
this validity should be independent of the application of the
measure in specific contexts. According to Messick, proper
application is as important, but strictly speaking, it should not
be called validity of tests, as the specific local consequences of
application are not inherent to the test itself. Based on Messick’s
argument, the term validity thus became separated from test use,
and while Messick stressed the importance of both, his divide
resulted in an increasing emphasis on validity as a test capacity
rather than sound use or interpretation. This psychometric
prioritizing of validity of tests is substantiated by guidelines
drafted by influential institutions such as the US Food and Drug
Administration (US Department of Health and Human Services
Food and Drug Administration, 2009). Hitherto, the discussion
still goes back and forth between “liberalists” (e.g., Crooks et al.,
1996; Kane, 2013) who focus on a justified use and interpretation
of test scores given a theoretical network in which interpretations
are embedded (Newton and Shaw, 2014, p. 176 and onward), and
“conservatists” (e.g., Lissitz and Samuelsen, 2007; Cizek, 2012;
Borsboom, 2015) who argue that validity should be solely focused
on the psychometric soundness of the test itself to capture its
intended construct.
According to Borsboom et al. (2004), “the concept that
validity theorists are concerned with seems strangely divorced
from the concept that working researchers have in mind when
posing the question of validity” (p. 1061). With ‘working
researchers’, they refer to test developers that design the measures.
For a test developer, they argue, every reference to theory,
nomological networks, or embeddedness of interpretation in the
then current body of scientific knowledge, would distract from
his primary task to guarantee that the measure actually measures
the real13 construct that it purports to measure (Borsboom
et al., 2004, p. 1061). In the same line, Strauss and Smith
(2009) emphasize the necessity of measuring unidimensional
constructs for the sake of valid measurement, in which they
understand “psychology” as experimental or lab psychology,
which, however, is only one branch of the broad field of
psychological research. By interpreting “the working researcher”
as psychometric researchers or test developers, and “psychology”
as limited to the experimental approach, the term validity
becomes a psychometric concept that indeed should be as clear
13See Slaney (2017) for a thorough discussion of the status and developments of
realism in scientific thinking, and how that relates to the understanding of validity.
as possible for the researcher who works in test construction or
experimental test research.
However, the problem is that this strictly psychometric
interpretation prohibits a whole range of researchers in the
fields of psychology and education from actually considering the
validity of their use of tests in epistemic research. Importantly,
the epistemic goal for applied researchers is principally different
from the psychometric goal of the test developer (cf. Elliott
and McKaughan, 2013; cf. footnote 3). This different, non-
psychometric researcher was already addressed by Cronbach
(1988), Kane (1992), and even Messick in his early years (see
Newton and Shaw, 2014). They argued that flawed use of a test
does decrease the validity of the test instrument itself, and thus
the intended test use should be part of the validation of the test,
which entails both the interpretation of score meaning and the
ethical consequences of test interpretation.14 Importantly, these
arguments are still focused on guaranteeing the validity of the
instrument, in which “test use” is understood as the application
of the test as intended by the test developer.
Recently, a powerful argument was made by Moss et al. (2004)
to broaden the term validity to validity of action, to enable users
to validly apply and combine tests in assessment practice in ways
that go beyond what test developers can intend to be tested.
For example, teachers who administer several tests during the
academic year to evaluate whether a student is ready to graduate,
cannot simply rely on the validity of one test but need to validly
combine sources of information to form a justified judgment (cf.
Jukola, 2017, on judgment in standardized scientific assessment).
In this educational setting, the validity argument needs to go
beyond the psychometric properties of the test (cf. conservative
view on psychometric validity), and beyond the nomological
network in which the proposed construct of the test is embedded
(cf. liberal view on psychometric validity), as it has to capture the
combination of tests as input for valid judgment in a dynamical
and (in this example) individualized situation.
The test use situation that Moss et al. (2004) refer to
is similar to diagnostic practice of psychologists who, for
example, combine multiple sources of information to assess
patients’ psychopathological symptoms before admitting them
to a treatment facility. Whereas Moss et al. (2004; see also
Moss, 2013) make a cogent argument for the necessity of
“validity in action”, our paper is not focused on test use
in clinical or educational practice but in clinical research, in
which the “working researcher” is the researcher who conducts
clinical or psychotherapy research within a specific epistemic
framework and with a specific epistemic goal. In the context
of psychotherapy research, the epistemic goal is not to indicate
the presence and severity of symptoms per se, but to interpret
the scores as a signal of something else. In this context, the
instrument is used for a different target than it was designed
for; that is, it is applied in a different research context with a
14Borsboom (2006) would in response argue that validation is not relevant to the
question of validity of measures as there cannot be such a thing as a “level of
validity”: according to Borsboom, a measure either is valid, or it is not. This is based
on a strictly realist ontological premise, which, however, seems hard to defend
in applied social science (cf. Gergen, 2001; Alexandrova, 2016; Alexandrova and
Haybron, 2016).
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different – often broader – goal than just measuring a certain
construct. Therefore, we do not only go beyond validity of tests
but also beyond validity of testing as an action of assessment; we
address the overarching validity of the research process in which
testing can be used as part of the broader epistemic endeavor
of the researcher.
Validity of Research
To be able to discuss the validity of the research process,
Campbell (1957) proposed the term “internal validity”, referring
to the soundness of the experimental design. In the context
of test construction, internal validity refers to the association
between items within scales as related to the overall measure.
But according to Campbell, internal validity can also be used
to evaluate whether the factors (both the constructs and the
operationalizations) and their relations that are proposed in
an experimental research design, indeed allow for a sound
conclusion. For example, if a researcher intends to draw causal
conclusions based on his research, it is necessary to use some sort
of interventionist design (cf. Woodward, 2003) that indeed allows
for causal conclusions, such as randomized controlled designs
(RCTs, cf. Kazdin, 2008 and Desmet, 2013, for a discussion of this
design in psychotherapy research).
When interpreted as a concept of “validity of research”,
“internal validity” could indeed cover the validity of the sequence
of operationalizations that was discussed in the previous section.
However, as we pointed out before, even when researchers
consider the validity of their research within their epistemic
proceedings, there is still little opportunity to critically discuss
regarding validity issues within the strictly outlined IMRAD
publication format. As the IMRAD model heuristically places
validity under the Measures header in the Methods section,
it implies an instrument-focused consideration of validity that
does not allow for proper consideration of epistemic choices or
practical and epistemic problems that researchers encounter in
designing and conducting the research design.15 Importantly, as
the IMRAD model does not allow for such a discussion, the
considerations are relegated to conceptual or scientific opinion
papers. This is not sufficient because it limits dialog amongst
working researchers on the concrete epistemic issues they face
in doing the research – and it also gives the impression that
published empirical papers are free from validity issues in the
overall procedure (a conclusion that would thus be derived by
means of face validity). Therefore, to be able to accurately discuss
validity of research in psychological papers, the IMRAD model
should be broadened (or loosened) to stimulate the consideration
of internal validity of research issues that are relevant to “working
researchers” in psychotherapy research.
15Such ‘heuristic’ understanding (cf. Hathcoat, 2013) is also noticeable in the
recent book “validity in psychological and educational assessment” by Newton and
Shaw (2014) that explicitly addresses working researchers. In their introduction,
they distinguish between “validity of measurement” and “validity of research” (p.
9 and onward), and remark that when they use “validity”, they mean “validity
of measurement”. This heuristic use of validity terminology echoes our earlier
point that by interpreting “the working researcher” as a psychometric researcher
(Borsboom, 2006) and “psychology” as experimental psychology (Strauss and
Smith, 2009), validity will be kept hostage in a psychometric debate that is not
sufficient to cover the validity of applied research as a scientific endeavor.
Although a proper dialog on issues of internal validity
would vitally aid valid psychotherapy research, it is important
to notice that the idea of internal validity is building on a
notion of realism, as it implies that given a certain specified
goal, there can be one right way of doing research (cf. Slaney,
2017, for a discussion of the status of realism in validity
debates). However, the fact that a design can have internal
validity does not imply whether the researcher should indeed
choose this design to answer his epistemic research questions.
A chosen design may be valid as a means to satisfy the
intended goal, but that does not imply that it is the only
nor the most appropriate means that the researcher could
choose.16 In practice, researchers can choose multiple research
designs, using multiple operationalizations and assessment
methods. Consequently, the design is not an epistemic given,
but a pragmatic, contextual and human-made choice that is
informed by the researcher’s epistemic framework and scientific
goals (cf. Elliott and McKaughan, 2013). Importantly, the
researcher’s choice for a design as a means to answer his or
her specific epistemic question is not accounted for by internal
validity (Figure 5).
Moreover, it is not covered by the “external validity” that was
proposed by Campbell (1957) either. External validity refers to
the generalizability or applicability of results and/or conclusions
to population level. Consequently, it only covers validity of the
research product, but not the choice for the research based on
the researcher’s epistemic aim per se. This is better covered
by a branch of external validity that is known as Ecological
Validity, which means that the research set-up resembles daily
life situations (cf. Brewer and Crano, 2000). Although this surely
is an important consideration regarding validity of research, it
is just one type of consideration in the range of decisions to
be made in the entire research endeavor. Mook (1983) even
argues that it is up to the researcher to decide to what extent
he or she thinks it is appropriate to generalize findings to
populations or daily life situations, depending on the specific
research goals. According to Schmuckler (2001), “one problem
with this multidimensionality, however, is that no explicit criteria
have been offered for applying this concept [of ecological validity]
to an evaluation of research” (p. 419; see Schmuckler, 2001,
for a historical overview of the various modalities of the term
ecological validity).
The concepts internal, external and ecological validity thus do
not (clearly) cover the entire scope of the research procedure,
not even when combined. Moreover, this multitude of types of
validity that working researchers can take into account, may give
the impression that researchers can pick and choose whichever
type they value most within the context of their research endeavor
(cf. Mook, 1983). Yet the fact that researchers can pursue such
choices, show that researchers have to make choices on the
value and direction of their research even before and beyond
16See Cartwright and Stegenga (2011) for a discussion on sufficient but
unnecessary conditions (“INUS-conditions”) to derive evidence that is useful and
valid in practice. Their discussion is focused at decision making in function of
evidence-based policy, but their use of INUS-conditions provides an insightfull
framework to understand the decision on the appropriateness of methods and
definition of evidence in applied research as well.
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choosing sound and valid methods. The entirety of epistemic
choices within research set-up, is and should be subject to
validity questioning.
This brings us to the validity of the function of
operationalization in applied research. As the function of the
design is bound to the epistemic proceedings of the researcher
within a specific scientific and societal context, its validity could
not be stated a priori nor context-independent, which makes
the realist notion of internal validity insufficient to capture the
validity of the overall epistemic endeavor (cf. Hacking, 1983).
To illustrate the importance as well as the non-self-evidence
of this function, consider the following example. EBT is often
justified as a way to offer the most effective treatment to the
largest amount of people. For such a goal, it does not necessarily
make epistemic sense to use a symptom measure such as the
BDI, as finding that people cry less than before after a course
of therapy does not imply more working days or less sick leave,
for example. So, if the epistemic goal were to scrutinize the
proportion of patients that would actually function better after
treatment in a societal sense, it could be more utile to measure
“efficacy” by means of sick leave days than by use of the BDI.
If the goal were to scrutinize the amount of people that do not
relapse, which requires durability of changes that were brought
about during treatment, it would make more epistemic sense to
measure specific dysfunctional experiences. And if the goal were
to reduce the risk on long-term health care costs, it would be
reasonable to indicate treatment success by means of long-term
cortisol level monitoring.
Importantly, thus, the specific end that a researcher intends
to satisfy by his epistemic endeavor should be specified in order
to evaluate whether an outcome measure can function validly
as a means to indicate the target concept. This indeed goes
beyond the realist notion of internal validity of the design that
was discussed before, as the target concept could be validly
operationalized in different ways, but the choice for one of
those many operationalizations should be arguably appropriate
to satisfy the actual epistemic goal of research. As the validity
of this function of research goes beyond the validity of the
operationalization sequence in the design itself, it is vital for
valid psychotherapy research to be able to consider the overall
validity of this function of the chosen research procedure
(cf. Westen et al., 2004).
To enable researchers to consider the validity of this specific,
local, and practical function of the design within their epistemic
endeavor, we use the working concept validity of the epistemic
process, or – in short – epistemic validity. We use this term purely
for the sake of our argument, to signal the issue of validity for
the overall epistemic process that is involved before and beyond
the practical operationalization that is heuristically considered
to be at stake when validity is considered. This term is used to
demarcate it clearly from psychometric validity that covers parts
of the operationalization within research. Further, as internal,
external and ecological validity all “start” from the chosen design,
but do not capture whether a design is valid given its function
within the overall epistemic process, we chose epistemic validity
over the previous terms associated with validity of research.
This broad notion of validity of the overall epistemic process
is close to the principle of methodological quality that Levitt
et al. (2017; APA Task Force on Resources for the Publication of
Qualitative Research) have formulated for qualitative research.
In an effort to summarize diverse terms used in the field of
quality control, they propose the use of the term Methodological
Integrity as the operationalization of trustworthiness of research,
which they define as follows:
“Integrity is the aim of making decisions that best support the
application of methods, as evaluated in relation to the following
qualities of each study. Integrity is established when research
designs and procedures [. . .] support the research goals (i.e., the
research problems/questions); respect the researcher’s approaches
to inquiry (i.e., research traditions sometimes described as
world views, paradigms, or philosophical/epistemological
assumptions); and are tailored for fundamental characteristics
of the subject matter and the investigators”. (Levitt et al., 2017,
pp. 9–10; italics in original).
Levitt et al. (2017) define integrity as composed of two flexible
criteria that allow for assessment of the trustworthiness of the
very diverse types of qualitative research and within varied
or even contrasting epistemic modes. First, fidelity concerns
“the intimate connection that researchers can obtain with
the phenomenon under study; [. . .] regardless of whether
[researchers] view the phenomena under study as social
constructions, existential givens, unmediated experiences,
embodied practices, or any kind of subject matter that may be
reflected in data and analyses” (Levitt et al., 2017, p. 10). Second,
utility concerns the “effectiveness of the research design and
methods, and their synergistic relationships, in achieving study
goals; [. . .] i.e., method as useful toward what end?” (ibid.) –
which the authors emphasize to argue against a de-contextualized
consideration of methods and procedures.
The formulations and aims of this task force indeed are close
to the aim that we set out in this paper. To make sure that validity
of research is considered as at least as important as validity of
measurement, however, we deem it important to acknowledge
that these issues together still regard the validity of research.
Terms such as integrity, coherence, trustworthiness, fidelity,
and utility, that are promoted by these and other qualitative
researchers in psychology (cf. Stiles, 1993; Elliott et al., 1999;
Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009), cover a lot of our concerns, but
they do not signal the validity root as firmly, whereas all proposed
quality control concepts in qualitative research in fact fall under
the umbrella of validity of the overall research process (cf.
Newton and Shaw, 2013).
Moreover, whereas the term integrity suggests a solo
enterprise bound to specific studies (cf. internal validity),
epistemic validity also captures more general discursive problems
in the psychological field (see also Prilleltensky, 2008), such as
the issues that were listed in the introduction, which share a
common root in the overall validity of research. Importantly,
also the initial consideration of applying quality control based
on a qualitative or quantitative research paradigm per se falls
under the validity of the entire research endeavor. This way,
our use of the term validity goes beyond semantics: epistemic
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validity may be considered the umbrella term that captures the
qualitative concepts of research integrity as well (see also footnote
12). It is not necessary to use this exact term, yet it is crucial that
the used term enables researchers to denote their own epistemic
stance within their scientific endeavor. We call this necessary
because with the current emphasis on EBT, research increasingly
influences practice, and in every step down the line from research
to dissemination to practice, the idea of validity becomes more
heuristic, which gives the impression that research is “right”. That
said, it seems crucial that researchers themselves ask the question
of validity of their means within their epistemic approach, as they
may be ascertained that people in practice – e.g., patients, health
care workers, and policy makers – will ascribe a certain truth
value to them (cf. Douglas, 2009).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we argued that the default psychometric
understanding of “validity” in psychology is insufficient in
capturing all the validity issues involved in the epistemic process
of psychotherapy research. In the first section, we used the
example of the BDI to show that reliance on psychometric
validity does not guarantee a valid psychotherapy research at
large. Surely, we are not the first to make this argument, but
given the persistently limited consideration of validity under the
Measures header in empirical psychological research papers, we
deem it necessary to show this problem in the most concrete
terms, so that our argumentation is as close as possible to the
concrete decisions that are made daily by working psychological
researchers. As we noted in this paper, we do not believe
that epistemic validity is never considered by psychotherapy
researchers, but given the prominent psychometric interpretation
that is substantiated by the format limitations in the IMRAD
model, validity is too often just discussed as if it were test validity
(e.g., Newton and Shaw, 2014, p. 9 and onward; see footnote 15).
As we argued that test validity is too limited to account
for the overall epistemic validity of the research procedure
in psychotherapy research, we conclude that it would not be
epistemically valid to rely on test validity for the entire procedure,
not even heuristically. Especially in times in which the emphasis
on EBT is increasing exponentially and quantitative research
methods are discursively prioritized, psychotherapy researchers
should at least ask the question of validity of their preferred
research methods as means to satisfy their epistemic and/or
clinical goals. Therefore, it is necessary to think carefully about
what the goal is concretely, to be able to analyze the validity of
the chosen means within the overall epistemic procedure. That
is, it seems crucial that researchers themselves ask the question of
validity of their means within their epistemic approach, to be able
to validly derive “evidence” for EBTs in psychotherapy.
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